The recent market downturn highlighted the substantial impact that capital markets fluctuations can have on retirement wealth. A possible strategy to manage investment risk is to purchase guarantees (i.e. put options), which can be fairly expensive. As an alternative, this paper suggests that an individual can self-insure against poor market outcomes by adjusting his retirement date as a function of market returns. To analyze this strategy, we introduce an endogenous retirement date in Merton's (1971) optional consumption and portfolio choice model. We show that with a flexible retirement date, the worker can effectively guarantee that his retirement wealth will not drop below an endogenously determined floor. The presence of this self-insurance may crowd out the demand for guarantees, which is consistent with the relatively small size of that market.
Introduction
With more than fifty percent of households owning stocks, workers are increasingly bearing financial market fluctuations through their retirement savings. 1 In the United
States, this trend may be exacerbated if proposals to introduce personal retirement accounts in social security are enacted (see Commission to Strengthen Social Security, 2001 ). For better or for worse, workers have taken on a greater stake in equity returns.
Market risk plays a particularly important role for workers approaching retirement, because their savings may be substantial at that time.
Fortunately, poor investment outcomes need not translate into financial hardship if, for example, the market recovers or the individual decides to work longer. In this research, we ask how a worker's ability to take investment risk is influenced by his capacity to adjust his retirement date as a function of market fluctuations. To answer this question, we compare the optimal portfolio choices that would be made alternatively with a fixed and a flexible retirement models. Since the portfolio choice literature generally assumes that the retirement date is fixed, we must introduce a new model which can accommodate a flexible (efficient) retirement date. This paper's main theoretical contribution is to show how to derive a closed-form solution for this model.
With this solution, we can generate a new set of predictions in terms of portfolio choices. Our results show that the worker can assume more investment risk when his retirement date is flexible instead of being fixed. This will be especially true for those with higher wages because they can easily substitute labor income for investment income. However, the flexible retirement strategy may not be as effective for those who have a greater amount of wealth exposed to market fluctuations because it will take them more additional work to recover from a given market downturn.
With a flexible retirement model, it is also possible to examine how the utility of leisure affects portfolio choice. While this utility had no impact with fixed retirement models, we show that those who are more eager to retire have an additional incentive to take investment risk. 2 Since this incentive disappears at retirement, we predict that the retiree may have to reduce substantially his allocation to the risky asset at that time.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the literature and Section 2 describes the optimal consumption and portfolio choice model. A closed-form solution for the flexible retirement model is derived in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 analyses these results and presents some comparative statics while Section 6 concludes.
Prior studies
Economic models that consider the joint determination of portfolio and retirement date are fairly rare. Perhaps, this is because the notion of retirement itself has evolved rapidly over the last decades. For instance, the concept of voluntary retirement is relatively new. According to Burtless (1999) , the proportion of workers retiring because they wished to has increased from 5 percent in the 1940's to 40 percent in the 1980's.
This trend has mainly been attributed to the growth of private pension plans and social security. Most of these programs were originally of the defined benefit (DB) type and they have popularized the notion of a "retirement age" at which workers were entitled to leave the workforce and receive a pension.
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Over the last two decades, many pension plans have adopted a new design, the defined contribution (DC) model. Since this design is becoming increasingly popular, this paper analyzes some of its implications for the "pure" case, i.e. when retirement is entirely financed with this type of savings vehicle. With a DC pension plan, periodic contributions are made to an individual account and the accountholder can generally direct his investments to several funds. Therefore, a main implication of the DC design is that retirement wealth is exposed to investment risk. To model optimal portfolio choice in that context, the finance literature has traditionally adapted Merton's (1971) framework by setting the length of the investment horizon equal to an exogenous retirement date. A recent example of this strategy can be found in Campbell and Viceira (2002) .
Though convenient, this modeling approach is somewhat arbitrary because DC plans do not provide structural incentives to retire at any particular age. 4 Intuitively, workers should retire early when their investments perform well and late when they do poorly. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that market performance affects retirement timing. For instance, the booming market of the 1990's has provided a natural experiment to test this hypothesis. Gustman and Steinmeir (2002) , Sevak (2002) , Khitatrakun (2002) , and Coronado and Perozek (2001) examined the empirical relationship between investment outcomes and retirement. They used data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to show that unpredicted increases in wealth induced 3 See Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) for a review of labor economics models which examined how retirement behavior was influenced by structural incentives in DB plans. 4 Note that there is no mandatory retirement age in the United States and in many other countries.
earlier retirement. In addition, it is reported in EBRI's Retirement Confidence Survey (2003) that baby boomers plan to postpone retirement in response to the recent bear market.
In this paper, our objective is to show how this relation between investment outcomes and retirement decision affects the portfolio choice problem. In fact, this idea is related to the labor supply flexibility concept developed by Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992) (BMS thereafter). BMS let the individual select an optimal quantity of work in each period and show that, in normal circumstances, the individual can assume more investment risk (vs. the fixed case). This idea has found empirical support in the works of Benítez-Silva (2001) and Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén (2003) . While BMS do not deal explicitly with labor supply flexibility in the form of a retirement date, they suggest that their results could be extended to include that case.
Since retirement is a complex problem which can be modeled in various ways, several approaches can be taken to extend BMS's idea to a retirement context. To define retirement, the most common approach in the portfolio choice literature is to describe it as an absorbing state, i.e. to assume that the worker is employed full-time until he retires completely and permanently. Kingston (2000) uses this approach to describe retirement as an optimal stopping time problem. In his model, retiring is efficient if this decision yields more expected utility than the alternative, which he defines as committing to retire at the best possible date. According to this rule, he shows that retirement will occur when the marginal utility from an additional year of work equates the marginal utility of leisure. While Kingston (2000) recognizes that the retirement date should be efficient, his model still uses a fixed retirement date to determine the optimal portfolio choices.
Another approach to model retirement was taken by Liu and Neis (2002) . They generalize BMS's model by introducing a constraint on leisure -when this constraint is binding, the worker exits the labor force. Liu and Neis (2002) define retirement as a state where wealth is sufficiently high to make it optimal to never work again (i.e. the constraint on leisure is binding in all possible future states). They conclude that workers who are likely to retire should invest a smaller proportion of their wealth in the risky asset.
In this paper, we follow Kingston's approach and define retirement as an absorbing state. 5 This definition was selected because it is supported by empirical evidence and it is analytically convenient. According to various statistics reported in Hurd (1993) , about 75% of workers move directly from full-time work to complete retirement. Furthermore, Hurd (1993) and Hutchens (1993 Hutchens ( , 2001 show that factors such as fixed costs makes it difficult for older workers to adjust their labor supply. In particular, retirees may not be able to return to work, especially without accepting a significant reduction in pay.
Since our model can be interpreted as an extension of Kingston's, it is useful to contrast the two. 6 In terms of assumption, the main difference is that we do not consider that the alternative to retiring now is to commit to retire at a given date in the future.
Instead, we use a more realistic alternative and assume that if the worker does not retire now, he will continue to work until an efficient retirement date is reached. Therefore, our model innovates by taking into account how a flexible retirement date may affect portfolio choices and our predictions will differ from Kingston's.
5 In Section 5, we discuss how the model's results would be affected if this assumption was relaxed. Essentially, the results would continue to hold, but their magnitude may change. 6 Note that since our model is neither a generalization nor a special case of Liu and Neis (2002) , it is difficult to compare the two. While they examine the effect of labor supply constraints on portfolio choices, we evaluate how they are affected by an endogenously determined investment horizon.
To solve this new problem, we adapt Merton's (1971) 
Model and Assumptions
Retirement income can be received from several sources. This is traditionally referred to as a three-legged stool consisting of employer benefits, social security, and private savings. For simplicity, these sources of income will not be modeled separately
here. Rather, we will assume that they each take the form of an individual retirement account where the worker can select his overall contribution rate and the level of risk of his investment portfolio. With this assumption, the model can be reduced to a standard optimal saving and investment problem.
This model considers only the case where the retirement criterion can be expressed as a function of wealth and preferences at retirement, but not as a function of time. This restriction is necessary in order to derive an analytical solution to the problem. We should note that this stationarity assumption limits our ability to analyze scenarios where preferences, labor income, or life expectancy are affected by the passage of time. 7 An example of a model where the length of the investment horizon is given by a stopping time can be found in the bankruptcy model of Sethi, Taksar, and Presman (1992) . To solve our problem, we will use their method as a starting point and adjust it to take into account the specifics of the retirement context.
Assumptions
Investment set. The individual is assumed to allocate his wealth between two assets, one risky, and one risk-free. The proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset is represented by the process { } , 0 t t α ≥ . Since this process is not constrained, there are no limits on borrowing and short-selling. The risk-free asset earns r and the risky asset return is given by the differential equation
is a standard Wiener process on { } , ,P Ω F , and
is a nondecreasing, right-continuous family of σ -algebras.
Preferences. The horizon is infinite and time preferences are represented by a discount rate 0 κ > . The individual is subject to a mortality decrement exponentially distributed with a force of mortality 0 η > . As Merton (1971) showed, adding η to the discount rate is equivalent to recognizing explicitly the mortality decrement and thus, the effective discount rate is given by β κ η = + .
The individual derives utility from consumption, which is denoted by a function ( ) u c . This function is assumed to be strictly increasing, concave, time-additive, and we 
The optimization problem
The optimization problem is a two-step process where the post-and pre-retirement problems are solved sequentially. First, we assume that the retiree solves a standard optimal consumption and portfolio choice problem, which can be represented with Merton's (1971) 
Post-retirement problem
8 Section 5 discusses how the results would be affected by an alternative set of assumptions for y . 9 For both the pre-and post-retirement problems, the optimal policies must be chosen amongst the set of admissible policies A , which comprises all the pairs { } With ( ) R x defined, we can move one step back and state the pre-retirement problem. During the employment phase, the worker generates utility from consumption and he receives utility ( ) R x τ at the time of retirement τ . The worker's value function is denoted by ( ) W x and it is the solution to the following problem.
Pre-retirement problem
Note that with the exception of y (wages), the wealth process in (5) is identical to the one in (3).
To complete this model, it remains to specify how the retirement date τ is defined.
While this date is usually fixed in this type of model, this paper's theoretical contribution is to examine the case where this date is an endogenous stopping time. For the retirement decision to be efficient, it must be the case that retiring yields at least as much utility as continuing to work, i.e. ( ) ( ) R x W x ≥ . Since this criterion can be met at several dates in the future, we assume that the worker will retire the first time this decision is efficient.
Therefore, the flexible retirement date τ can be represented by the stopping time
In Section 3, we will derive a closed-form solution for the value functions ( ) W x and ( ) R x and show that there exists a unique value 
To guarantee a solution to
, we require that * ( ) R x be finite. Further, to Accordingly, * x denotes the level of wealth at retirement and for the moment, we will assume that this value exists and solve the problem accordingly.
Closed-form solution for ( ) W x
While our ultimate objective is to compute the optimal allocation to the risky asset, our first step is to obtain a closed-form solution for the pre-retirement value function ( ) W x . According to stochastic control, a potential solution ( ) W x to the flexible retirement problem should satisfy two conditions:
1. The problem's Bellman equation;
2. The boundary condition
This result is formalized in Proposition 3.1 below.
Proposition 3.1. For 0 t τ ≤ < , * / y r x x − < ≤ , and
and
and ( )
then make sure that there is an incentive to retire eventually, we require that
the minimum amount of utility that can be obtained by never retiring.)
Proof. The optimal controls in (9) and (10) can be obtained from the Bellman equation's first-order conditions. In Appendix A, we verify that the objective function is optimized by these controls.
Remark. At first sight, equation (9) seems to give us the solution for α , the optimal allocation to the risky asset. However, this solution is incomplete since the derivatives of ( ) W x are not known yet. In the remainder of this section, we derive a closed-form solution for ( ) W x to complete the solution for α .
Notation
The next step to identify ( ) W x is usually to "guess" the form of this function and then verify that it satisfies the Bellman equation and the boundary condition, i.e.
equations (7) and (8). Since our model is stationary, it will be possible to use a different strategy and compute ( ) W x directly. This is done by adapting a technique used in Presman and Sethi (1991) and introducing some additional notation and functions. 11 Most of our notation is similar to the one used in Presman and Sethi (1991) , with the exception of a change of variable
Note that the solution to our problem will differ from theirs because our stopping time is expressed in terms of the wealth process increasing to an endogenously determined level of wealth * x rather than decreasing to zero. 12 The functions λ and ( ) X λ have a particular interpretation when they are used in conjunction with martingale methods: they represent respectively the Lagrange multiplier and the static budget constraint.
In Section 3.2, we will show that it is possible to derive a differential equation for ( ) X λ and to solve it. This solution will be interesting because it can then be used to obtain a formula for ( ) W x . To express the solution to ( ) X λ , the following notation will be useful: 
The Bellman equation and ( ) W x
With the notation just defined in Section 3.1, we will show how to derive a function ( ) W x which satisfies the Bellman equation. As usual with stochastic control, we rewrite the Bellman equation in (7) by evaluating it with the optimal controls:
Equivalently, by operating a change of variable ( )
we can rewrite (14) as
By differentiating this last equation with respect to λ and rearranging terms, we obtain the second-order, ordinary, linear differential equation
Fortunately, the general solution to this type of differential equation is known. By using some additional conditions detailed in Appendix B, we show that the solution to
By combining this equation with (15), we obtain the following closed-form solution for
The boundary condition
We can observe that the solution in (18) (18) and the one for * ( ) R x can be adapted from a result in Karatzas and Shreve (1998) . Using our notation, this solution can be written as
By setting
and canceling terms, we obtain the following solution for * λ : 
Therefore, this completes the solution for ( ) W x .
Our results so far can be summarized as follows: 1) we derived a closed-form solution for ( ) W x and 2) we characterized the retirement decision by the criteria
In the next section, the first result will be combined with the formula for α in (9) to obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal allocation to the risky asset. The retirement criteria will be analyzed further in Section 5.
Optimal allocation to the risky asset
In this section, we derive a closed-form solution for flex α and fixed α , the optimal allocation to the risky asset in the flexible and fixed retirement cases respectively. With these results, we show that retirement flexibility allows the worker to take more investment risk.
Portfolio choice with the flexible retirement model
Below, the results of Section 3 are used to derive an analytical solution for the optimal allocation to the risky asset with the flexible retirement model. Note that we simply present this result here and will analyze it later in more detail in Section 5. 
where λ , * λ , ( ) A λ , and ( ) B λ are given respectively in equations (17), (20), (12), and (13).
Proof. In Proposition 3.1, the optimal allocation to the risky asset was given in equation (9) 
Portfolio choice with the fixed retirement model
To analyze the result we just obtained, it will be useful to compare it with the output of a fixed retirement model. For the counterfactual, we use a model similar to the one described in Section 2, with the exception that retirement occurs at an exogenously given date T . Note that our objective is not to make a "fixed vs. flexible" comparison valid for any value of T . Rather, the fixed retirement model should be designed such that the difference between the fixed and flexible models can be attributed only to the flexibility effect. In particular, this difference could also be explained by a wealth effect because the value of human capital is a function of T in the fixed retirement model and it may not be the same as the one in the flexible model. To remove this arbitrary wealth effect from the comparison, we assume that T is chosen such that the value of human capital is the same in both models. 14 Therefore, the fixed retirement problem at time t is given by
s.t.
( )
The optimal controls for this problem take the same form as the ones in Proposition 3.1.
To express the solution to (22)- (23), the notation ( , )
is used again to denote the marginal utility of wealth.
In Appendix C, we show that the value function ( , ) W x t for the fixed retirement problem can be expressed as ( ) 
Note that for the moment, we will restrict our attention to the portfolio decision and in Section 5.3, we will come back to the analysis of the value function ( , ) W x t .
14 In Appendix D, we show that * 2 / ln( / ) T t r ρ λ λ − = − . We also note that for a general utility function, an increase in wealth may either increase or reduce the allocation to the risky asset. Therefore, if a wealth effect was included in the comparison, it would not be possible to predict for the general case whether the allocation to the risky asset would increase with a flexible retirement assumption. (25), (12), and (13).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Fixed vs. flexible retirement comparison
The results in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 show that the formulas for 
Thus, we extend BMS's result for the case where labor supply flexibility takes the form of a flexible retirement date instead of variable work hours. In the next section, we provide the intuition for the result in (27) and analyze it further.
Analysis
This section suggests four steps that can be taken to translate the results of the previous section into portfolio recommendations. We also contrast our predictions with the ones obtained in related research and consider how the results would be affected by alternative assumptions.
Determining the expected retirement date
With fixed retirement models, it is customary to describe the optimal portfolio allocation as a function of T t − , the length of the investment horizon. For instance, BMS predict that an investor should reduce his allocation to the risky asset as retirement Therefore, we can predict that a worker who is not constrained to retire at a particular date will expect to retire sooner when:
• his financial wealth x is high (relatively to
• his utility of leisure at retirement is high (relatively to y ):
Note that we can also use the expression for [ ] Remark. The retirement decision can also be analyzed by examining the condition under which a retirement date is efficient. This is the approach taken by Kingston (2000) , who characterizes his efficient retirement date by * y L λ β = (using our 15 For the case 0 b > , the probability that the worker retires eventually is less than one and to take this into account, we compute [ ] | E τ τ < ∞ . However, for simplicity, we use the notation [ ] E τ in Proposition 5.1.
Note that for the case 0 b ≤ , this notation is correct since the worker retires with probability one and
notation). 16 In other words, he predicts that the worker will retire when the marginal utility from an additional year of work is equal to the marginal utility of leisure. , which is lost when the worker retires. By comparison with Kingston's rule, our results suggest that the worker should require a higher level of wealth to be indifferent to retire.
Evaluating the effectiveness of a flexible retirement strategy
Next, it will be interesting to identify the characteristics that make the flexible strategy valuable, i.e. those for which flex fixed α α − will be greater. Before presenting the comparative statics, we should note that it is difficult to obtain an unambiguous prediction for any of the investor's characteristics. 18 Therefore, the reader should keep in mind that the following are partial derivatives only:
16 Recall that our model differs from Kingston's (2000) mainly because we assume that the retirement date is flexible while he assumes that it is fixed. Therefore, he defines an efficient retirement date as the best choice if the worker had to commit to retire at a given date. 17 This result was also obtained earlier in Mitchell and Fields (1984) . 18 The problem is that each variable influences Another aspect of the problem to consider is the investor's exposure to market risk.
For example, take two individuals who are identical, but whose wealth is respectively $100,000 and $1,000,000. For a given market shock, the second individual will have to work ten times more than the first one to mitigate his investment loss. Therefore, the flexible strategy should be less effective for wealthier individuals, explaining the result Finally, it is also interesting to consider what would happen with some more general assumptions regarding the labor income process. If the income stream was a function of time, the relevant measure of flexibility would be the wage level around the expected retirement date. For instance, if a worker anticipates that he will only be able to work part time when he will need to delay retirement, the flexible strategy may not be very helpful for him. Similarly, the effectiveness of the flexible strategy may be reduced if a market downturn also affects wages negatively. In addition, the impact of flexibility on portfolio choice could be reduced by constraints on labor supply near the expected retirement date.
Assessing eagerness to retire
Another way to think about the determination of 
Proof. See Appendix F. is a convex function of time, the utility gain associated with retiring early is greater than the utility loss associated with retiring late and thus, the worker has an incentive to take investment risk. 19 This idea is illustrated in Figure 1 with the help of Jensen's theorem. Note that this effect should be more important when the worker is particularly eager to retire, i.e. when he has a high value of L . Indeed, we can verify that
Since we have little empirical evidence regarding preferences for the risky timing of an outcome, it would be interesting to verify our model's prediction in future research.
Regardless of the actual form of these preferences, the bottom line is that the impatience to retire should be taken into account when making portfolio decisions.
Reducing the allocation to the risky asset at retirement
Above, we mentioned that the potential gain in utility from leisure creates an incentive for the worker to take investment risk. At retirement, this incentive disappears and consequently, the investor must behave more prudently. To measure this, recall that the optimal allocation to the risky asset at the time of retirement is given by 19 If this expression was the only component of the utility function, then it would be optimal for the investor to take as much risk as he can. However, the objective function also features a consumption component, which limits the attraction of taking investment risk. We should also note that despite the fact that a portion of the objective function is convex in time, the overall function is always concave in wealth.
It is also straightforward to show that right after retirement, this allocation decreases to
at the time of retirement, the allocation to the risky asset is suddenly reduced by an
Note that this is a new result which is in contrast with the one obtained by Kingston (2000) who predicts that the allocation to the risky asset should be smooth through the point of retirement. In his case, flexibility was not included in the model in the first place, so it could not be lost at retirement.
We should also note that the existence of a "jump" is a result that would also hold under most alternative work/retirement assumptions. However, the magnitude of the discontinuity may be smaller and its size will be determined by the amount of labor supply flexibility lost by retiring. For instance, one may argue that the "jump" would disappear if we assumed that the retiree could return to work. Since empirical evidence suggests that the retiree's ability to return to work is uncertain and generally entails a loss in pay, we would still predict that retirement should be accompanied by a more prudent investment strategy. Another example would be a worker whose labor supply is very constrained to start with. In that case, flexibility has only a modest impact on the preretirement portfolio and thus, retiring has little effect on the investment strategy.
It is also interesting to mention that this idea could be applied to other circumstances where labor supply flexibility is significantly impaired. For example, we can suggest that investors revise systematically their allocation to the risky asset downwards when they are affected by a major disability or unemployment.
Discussion and conclusions
As more workers bear stock market risk through pensions and individual accounts, they become increasingly vulnerable to capital market fluctuations. This is often pointed out by observers who project the value of individual accounts at retirement and show a wide disparity in the outcomes. 20 This paper shows that delaying retirement could help buffer retirement consumption, which would reduce retirement wealth volatility.
Therefore, we suggest that policy studies of individual accounts should shift their focus from consumption to labor supply outcomes. From a risk management perspective, we conclude that investment risk will be a threat to retirement security only to the extent that the worker is unable to adjust his labor supply in response to a market shock.
Our flexible retirement model also offers some new predictions in terms of portfolio choice. We show that the ability to adjust the retirement date is associated with a greater capacity to assume investment risk. This will be particularly true for those who have a high wage/wealth ratio, i.e. for those who have to exert relatively little effort to make up for market downturn by working longer. Our model also has a unique feature which shows that eagerness to retire creates an incentive to take investment risk. At the time of retirement, this incentive disappears and we predict a sudden decline in the allocation to the risky asset.
Finally, it is important to mention that our choice of assumptions was limited in order to preserve the problem's closed-form solutions. For future research, it would be 20 For example, see Burtless (2003) .
interesting to use a numerical approach to examine a more realistic set of assumptions.
For instance, it would be interesting to introduce shocks to labor income or impose constraints on labor supply. It would also be relevant to analyze the "mixed" case where the retiree receives benefits from both a DB and a DC plan. In this appendix, we complete the proof of Proposition 3.1 with a derivation similar to the one in Theorem 4.1 of Karatzas, Lehoczy, Sethi, and Shreve (1986) 
Finally, since (0) u is finite we can subtract (0) / u β from both sides of the inequality to obtain ( )
Now let 
The desired result is obtained by rewriting (A3) as 
Note that the second condition can be rewritten as 
To express the solution to this problem, we adopt a strategy similar to the one for the flexible case and introduced a notation ( , ) 
where the functions ( ) 
We suggest the following equation as a candidate solution for ( , ) W x t :
We will verify that the solution suggested in (A15) satisfies equations (A13) and (A14). 
Second, it is trivial to verify that ( , ) ( ) 
and thus, we can apply the usual method to obtain the first moment of τ :
22 Karatzas and Shreve (1998) showed how to obtain Alternatively, we could adapt a derivation by Presman and Sethi (1996) and obtain the same result with some additional calculations. 
To prove that the expression is positive, recall that 2 ρ must satisfy the quadratic equation 
